In this post, we shall present an answer (due to P. Larson) to a question by A. Primavesi concerning a certain strong form of club guessing.
We commence with recalling Shelah’s concept of club guessing.
Concept (Shelah). Given a regular uncountable cardinal and a subset , we say that is a club-guessing sequence, if the following two holds:
- is a subset of , for every ;
- for every club subset , there exists some nonzero with such that and are alike.
Now, here are a few concrete instances of being alike:
- ;
- ;
- , (so, is bounded below );
- , and ;
- , and .
Note that . In particular, if holds, then carries a club-guessing sequence. However, in contrast to , club-guessing sequences are often consequences of ZFC, hence allowing to prove ZFC results that were previously known to follow from -type assumptions (here’s a recent example) :
Theorem (Shelah). Suppose that are given infinite regular cardinals, and is a stationary subset of .
- if , then carries a club-guessing sequence in the sense of (2) above.
- if , then carries a club-guessing sequence in the sense of (4) above.
To give you a taste of the flavour of the proofs of these theorems, we provide here a proof of the instance .
Proof. Suppose that is a given stationary set. For every , pick a club subset of order-type . We claim that there exists some club such that is a club-guessing sequence in the sense of (2) above. Suppose not. Then there exists a decreasing chain of club subsets of , , with , such that for every , and every , either , or .
Consider the club . Let be an accumulation point of (the choice is possible, since the set of accumulation points of is a club, and is stationary). So , and hence is a club in . As , we get that , and so a standard close-off argument shows that . In particular, for every . It now follows that for every , . So is a strictly decreasing chain of subset of of length , contradicting the fact that .
To see that not all instances of club-guessing are consequences of ZFC, we also mention the following. Let denote the assertion that for every P-Ideal over , one of the following holds:
- there exists a club such that ;
- there exists a stationary subset such that .
Theorem (Eisworth-Nyikos, 2009). PFA implies .
In particular, under PFA, there exists no-club guessing sequence for , even in the weakest sense of (5) above.
Proof of the second part. Suppose that is a club-guessing sequence, with for every . Let
It is clear that is downward closed, as well as closed under finite unions. Next, we note the following:
- If is a club, then there exists some limit for which the element of our club-guessing sequence satisfies . As , we infer that is not a subideal of .
- If and , then . To see this, put , and let denote some enumeration of . Then recursively construct an injection such that . As , such a function may indeed be constructed. Put . Then . It follows that for every stationary subset .
Thus, we have shown that the alternatives of fails for , and this must mean that is not a P-ideal. To get a contradiction, we prove that it is a P-ideal:
We need to show that for any given collection , there exists some such that for all . As is downard closed, we may assume that are mutually disjoint. Fix a bijection . Then for all , define by letting for all :
As PFA implies that , we may pick a function such that for all . Now, let . Then, for every , is finite. Now, let us assume towards a contradiction that . Then, we may find some such that is infinite. As while is finite for all , let us pick a large enough such that and . Pick , and let . Since , we get that . In particular, , and so by definition of , we get that , contradicting the choice of in . .
We remark that the assumption was not essential in the above proof, and also that Hirschorn established the consistency of a generalization of together with CH.
We now arrive to the following strong form of club guessing.
Definition (Primavesi). For a regular uncountable cardinal , and a stationary subset , we say that holds, if there exists a sequence such that:
- is a subset of ;
- for every stationary subset , there exists some with , for which .
So instead of guessing clubs, the sequence guesses stationary subset of , but, more importantly, it does so within these sets.
I met Alex Primavesi at the Young Set Theory 2010 meeting, and he asked me about the consistency of his principle. It didn’t take long to realize that if , then fails for all stationary subsets . Let’s first dispose of this observation!
Sketch of the proof. Suppose that witnesses for a stationary with . Without loss of generality, we may assume that for all . First, notice that for every stationary subset , there exists a club such that for every . Next, pick distinct regular cardinals smaller than such that is stationary. Then, construct a decreasing chain of clubs such that:
Put , and . Utilize the fact that , to argue that for every . Consider . As , there must exist some , contradicting the minimality of .
My proof uses the fact that in a crucial way (the existence of follows from it), and hence the case requires a different handling. After asking people who know a great deal of the constructible universe whether holds in , without getting definite answer, I considered another extreme – getting a model in which the nonstationary ideal on is dense, together with a variant of the standard club guessing property for . I was under the impression that a -variation could produce such a model (and that would hold there), so I wrote to Paul Larson. To my surprise, after a while, he sent me a very short and elegant disproof of Primavesi’s principle.
Proposition (Larson, 2011). fails for every stationary (and every regular uncountable cardinal ).
Proof. Suppose not, and let be a -sequence. Recursively define a function by letting for all : Put . Then , and we consider two cases.
- If is stationary, then there must exist some such that . That is . But then, , i.e., . This is a contradiction.
- If is nonstationary, then there exists a club which is disjoint from . So is stationary, and we may find some such that . That is, . It follows that , and hence , i.e.,. This contradicts the fact that .
Open Problems
We saw that Primavesi’s principle is inconsistent. Still, there are other generalizations of club guessing which I find important, and their state is currently unclear. Let me mention the following two.
Quesion A (#10, in here). Suppose that is an uncountable cardinal, and is stationary.
Does there exist a sequence that guesses clubs in the following sense: for every club , there exists some with such that .
Some partial answers:
- For regular, the answer is yes.
- For singular and such that is stationary, the answer is yes.
- For singular and that does not reflect, the answer is consistently no (from very large cardinals);
- For singular and that reflects on some fixed cofinality club often (i.e., there is some uncountable regular cardinal such that contains a club relative to ), the answer is yes.
- For singular and that reflects stationarily often, the answer is yes provided that holds.
So, the remaining case is that in which is a singular cardinal, and merely reflects stationarily often. Notice that (and ) necessarily fails in any model that serves as a counterexample, however, that’s not very much of a problem, as this has already been established a couple of years ago.
Question B. Suppose that is an uncountable regular cardinal, and that are disjoint stationary subsets of .
Does there exist a sequence that guesses clubs in the following sense: for every club , there exists some with such that
Note that by , we get that for all . Also notice that necessarily fails in any model that serves as a counterexample.
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For a proof on the existence of club-guessing over a stationary set concentrating on points of countable cofinality, see here.
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In order for the concept to be non-trivial, it seems that you need to specify somewhere in the definition.
Now corrected. Thanks!